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Abstract. We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies
in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties can-
not include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up.
Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and
decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the
court, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post.
There are two eﬀects of a court that voids contracts. The parties’ incentives
to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investment are reduced, and the parties enjoy
greater insurance against the unforeseen contingencies that the ex-ante contract
cannot account for.
In this context, we fully characterize the optimal decision rule for the court.
The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the tradeoﬀ between the
need for incentives and the gains from insurance that voiding in some circum-
stances oﬀers to the agents.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Courts regularly intervene in contracts at the behest of one of the contracting parties
to void, or otherwise modify, an agreement the parties have signed. One justiﬁcation
for courts overriding voluntary agreements is to insure the parties against changes in
the environment between the time the agreement was made and the time when it is
to be consummated. Changes in the environment can lead to changes in the costs
and beneﬁts to the parties involved that expose them to risks which they prefer to
avoid.1 The possibility of renegotiation protects the parties from carrying out Pareto-
dominated transactions, but not from the ﬂuctuations in utility that stem from the
uncertainty in the underlying environment.
If the parties foresee all relevant contingencies and agree on the optimal trans-
actions given them, these can be included in the contract, thus providing protection
from these risks. Both common sense and court decisions suggest that such foresight
is unreasonable, however. Regardless of the parties’ experience and care in design-
ing their contract, there will always be residual risk they face due to “unforeseen
contingencies.”
There is considerable ambiguity about the meaning of unforeseen contingencies,
we will discuss the term brieﬂy before proceeding further. We take the position that
parties can perfectly foresee the possibility of various contingencies, but are unable to
describe the circumstances in suﬃcient detail to include all relevant contingencies in3
their contract.2 When the contracting parties understand that they are unaware of all
signiﬁcant potential events, the question arises as to how they can protect themselves
against the risks they face when committing to a necessarily incomplete contract.
In this paper, we take the view that although contracting parties are unable to
identify all relevant contingencies ex-ante, it may be clear both to the parties and
outsiders that the circumstances at the time the contract calls upon one of the parties
to act diﬀer materially from those envisioned at the time the contract was written.
In this event, a court can make such a determination, and void the contract in order
to provide insurance the parties arguably desire, but cannot eﬀect on their own. A
primary goal of this paper is to model formally the eﬀects of ex-ante unforeseen events
that might be recognized as such ex-post.
A court that voids contracts in this way may provide desirable insurance, but
not without cost. A central beneﬁt of a contract is a guarantee that parties will
receive a return for investments that have speciﬁc value in their relationship. Without
a guarantee, an individual has a diminished incentive to invest, because he may
obtain only a portion of the beneﬁts stemming from investment under an ex-post
(re-)negotiated outcome. Courts that void contracts to provide insurance do so at
the cost of reducing the ability to provide incentives for an eﬃcient level of ex-ante
investment.
We develop and analyze a model of a buyer and a seller who contract in an envi-
ronment that includes an active court whose role is to determine which contracts to
void and which to uphold.3 In our model, a court can coordinate and guide contract-4
ing parties by means of precedents that shape the contracting parties’ expectations
about future rulings. We assume that the court maximizes ex-ante expected gains
from contracting, and characterize the optimal policy, which is to void contracts in
events which are deemed ex-post to impose a high level of uninsurable risk on the
contracting parties.
In the simple set-up that we analyze, the interests of all participants are aligned.
Ex-ante, the objective function of the court is not in conﬂict with the expected utility
of either of the trading parties. This, in turn, implies that the parties could attempt
to replicate the behavior of the optimal court using private means. However, this
will only be true in the simpliﬁed set-up that we deal with here. For example, if
there is any asymmetric information between the contracting parties informational
externalities would arise and this conclusion would not necessarily hold.4
1.2. Relation to the Literature
The seminal works on incomplete contracts by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990) took as given the existence of contingencies that may occur after
the signing of a contract, but that cannot be described at the time the parties con-
tract. The inability to describe all relevant contingencies, and make contract terms
a function of them, aﬀects agents’ incentives. When contracts are incomplete, the
contracting parties may ﬁnd it optimal to renegotiate the terms of trade in the event
that certain contingencies arise. Agents whose investments are sunk at this time will
not receive the full beneﬁts of those investments. This holdup problem leads to inef-5
ﬁcient initial investments. In summary, incomplete contracts may make it impossible
to avoid ineﬃcient outcomes.
A number of papers have shown that the amount of ineﬃciency, however, is not
ﬁxed. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) show that the ownership
structure of physical assets can aﬀect investment incentives, and hence, eﬃciency;
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that if it is impossible to contract over some
part of a relationship, it may be optimal to be less speciﬁc than is possible in other
parts of that relationship; Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)
show that the distribution of authority and power in a ﬁrm can aﬀect eﬃciency when
complete contracts are impossible.
Both the original work illustrating how incomplete contracts can precipitate inef-
ﬁciency, and the subsequent work demonstrating how institutional design can amelio-
rate that ineﬃciency, essentially ignore the role of a court in adjudicating and enforc-
ing contracts that are written.5 The ineﬃciencies analyzed in the papers discussed
above might be diminished by a court that can ameliorate them through various forms
of intervention.6 Stated more strongly, the work on incomplete contracts is “partial
equilibrium,” analyzing a subset of agents’ behavior taking as ﬁxed the behavior of
agents outside the model (the courts), without investigating whether the assumed
ﬁxed behavior of the outside agents is in fact optimal. Maskin and Tirole (1999)
make this point most forcefully by showing that in a standard incomplete contracting
model, the existence of undescribable (unforeseen) contingencies does not aﬀect the
set of payoﬀ outcomes that can be achieved through contracting, if one allows a court6
with large discretionary authority. This is shown by exhibiting a mechanism capa-
ble of generating as equilibrium any payoﬀs that could be achieved with complete
contracts. This mechanism does not mean that contract incompleteness is irrelevant,
however. Maskin and Tirole (1999) expands the scope of interaction between the
contracting parties and the court to include arbitrary systems of communication, and
clearly go beyond anything seen in practice.
Our paper incorporates an active court, the scope of which is limited, in contrast to
both the traditional literature, and Maskin and Tirole (1999). We provide a detailed
speciﬁcation of undescribable contingencies, including the information available to a
court at the time performance is called for. The contracts that parties write diﬀer from
those they would write if courts did nothing more than passively enforce the contracts
that are written. Despite the inclusion of a more active court, the basic message of
the incomplete contracting literature remains: contracts will still be incomplete, and
the incompleteness causes ineﬃciency.
There is a relatively large literature on the eﬀect of the rules courts use on the
actions of those governed by the rules. For example, there is a substantial body of
analysis comparing the incentive eﬀects of strict liability with the incentive eﬀects
of a negligence rule in tort theory, and comparisons of diﬀerent remedies for breach
in contract theory.7 Our analysis diﬀers from this work in two ways. First, these
literatures focus largely on particular rules that are used in practice, and compare
the incentive eﬀects of those rules in diﬀerent environments. In contrast, we consider
a richer set of rules, with courts optimizing across that set; our framework admits7
more easily the formulation of alternative rules to those already in existence. The
second diﬀerence is that earlier work is typically concerned with comparisons between
qualitatively diﬀerent rules, while our court must make quantitative decisions, such
as the threshold for which unforeseen contingencies will change the court’s decision
of whether or not to void the contract.8
A major beneﬁt of formally incorporating the court is that it allows a richer
analysis of contracting. In addition, it provides the structure for a serious examination
of what precisely a court might do. In this paper, we restrict attention to particularly
simple rules a court can follow, namely to determine the circumstances under which
a contract will be voided.
1.3. Court Practices
We discussed in the previous subsection the relation of our work to previous literature.
Before proceeding to our formal model, it is useful to also discuss the relation between
our work and actual court practices to illustrate that courts insure contracting parties
along the lines we argue are optimal. They will discharge a party’s obligation to
perform under a contract based on the emergence of risks that were not foreseen
at the time the contract was entered into under some conditions. There are several
categories of intervening events that might be the basis for excusing performance, two
of which are similar to the unforeseen contingencies that are the focus of this paper.
The ﬁrst is impracticability of performance; this occurs when unanticipated events
subsequent to contracting make the promised performance extremely burdensome8
economically. The second category is termed frustration of purpose. One view of
the frustration doctrine is that it will “[...] excuse performance where performance
remains possible, but the value of the performance to at least one of the parties and
the basic reason recognized by both parties for entering into the contract have been
destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event.”9
The court intervention proposed in this paper that voids contracts under some
circumstances can be considered to be of either of these two types. Performance is
clearly not impossible, since ultimately the contracted transaction is consummated;
the voiding of the contract serves only to relieve one or the other of the parties from
an abnormally negative consequence resulting from supervening events. Frustration
of purpose has been applied in a manner very similar to that proposed in this paper.
Small risks will not be cause for voiding the contract, but suﬃciently large risks will
be.
“It is, of course, the very essence of contract that it is directed at the elim-
ination of some risks for each party in exchange for others. Each receives
the certainty of price, quantity, and time, and assumes the risk of chang-
ing market prices, superior opportunity, or added costs. It is implicit in
the doctrine of impossibility (and the companion rule of ‘frustration of
purpose’) that certain risks are so unusual and have such severe conse-
quences that they must have been beyond the scope of the assignment
of risks inherent in the contract, that is, beyond the agreement made by
the parties. To require performance in that case would be to grant the9
promisee an advantage for which he could not be said to have bargained in
making the contract. [...] The question is, given the commercial circum-
stances in which the parties dealt: Was the contingency which developed
one which the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a
real possibility which could aﬀect performance? Was it one of that variety
of risks which the parties were tacitly assigning to the promisor by their
failure to provide for it explicitly? If it was, performance will be required.
If it could not be so considered, performance is excused.”10
This case is not an isolated instance. Willinston on Contracts (Rev. ed., 1938), a
standard reference to the interpretation of contracts, has this to say:
“The important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has
made performance of the promise vitally diﬀerent from what should rea-
sonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they
entered into the contract. If so, the risk should not fairly be thrown upon
the promisor.”
We focus on the case in which the events that alter the costs and beneﬁts to the
parties of performance as speciﬁed in the contract were unforeseeable, but courts have
typically taken a less stringent attitude of the circumstances in which supervening
events could warrant excusing performance. Speciﬁcally, it is not necessary that a
supervening event be literally unforeseeable, but rather, that it was in fact unforeseen;
this is illustrated by the following two cases.10
“The question we answer here is not whether the destruction of the for-
est’s regenerative capacity should have been considered at the time of
contracting but, rather, whether it was considered. There is nothing in
the contract nor in the parties’ dealings to suggest that the parties ever
presumed more than a continuance of the conditions necessary to give
purpose to a selective cut contract. In short, the contract did not address
the conditions that arose; hence, further performance under the contract
is excused.”11
“[...] it would be untenable to conclude that the parties intended that the
[plaintiﬀs] should assume the risk of an adverse tax ruling simply because
such a ruling was, in a sense, ‘foreseeable’ and because the contract did
not expressly excuse performance in the event of its occurrence.”12
The main point of this paper is to demonstrate how a court can increase welfare by
excusing performance in some situations where unforeseen events have dramatically
changed the consequences of performance for one of the parties to a contract. We
point out that the role for courts that we advocate ﬁts within the UCC: “Delay in
delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a breach of his duty
under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made [...]”. UCC 2-615(a). Comment 4 to this provision
provides more substance:11
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of
the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a
justiﬁcation, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business
contracts made at ﬁxed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage
of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo,
local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply, which
either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents seller from
securing supply necessary for his performance, is within contemplation of
this section.
The optimal court that we derive below is entirely consistent with this. The code
allows for excuse when there is a “marked” increase in the cost to the seller. Our
model will call for excuse when there is an unforeseen contingency that results in
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the actual and the expected cost. The value of the
insurance that results from excusing performance outweighs the diminished incentives
to invest that accompany voiding the contract. In sum, contract law is amenable to
the rule that we will derive.13
1.4. Outline
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 below we describe the
model in full detail, and we comment on the assumptions we make. We characterize
in Section 3 the equilibrium contract that the parties to the trade will choose for12
general court’s decision rules while in Section 4 we present the main result of the
paper: the characterization of the optimal decision rule for the court. In Section 5
we discuss several leading cases dealing with frustration and impracticability in the
context of our optimal court. Section 6 concludes the paper. For ease of exposition
we have relegated all proofs to an Appendix.
2. The Model
As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in courts that have a role in
trading oﬀ parties’ incentive to invest with their desire for insurance in the event of
unforeseen contingencies. To investigate this tradeoﬀ, we consider a simple buyer and
seller model.
For insurance to have any beneﬁt, at least one of the parties must be risk averse;
we assume a risk neutral buyer and risk averse seller. The buyer and seller trade a
widget; the risk they face is that the cost and beneﬁt of the widget are uncertain at
the time they contract. The uncertainty about costs and beneﬁts captures the idea
that there is a “normal” cost and beneﬁt, cN and vN, but that both parties are aware
that there is a possibility that an unforeseen contingency could give rise to high levels
of costs and beneﬁts: cH and vH. For simplicity we assume that the gains from trade
are constant, that is
∆ = vH − cH = vN − cN.
Hence, it is eﬃcient to trade whether the costs and beneﬁts are normal or high. This
assumption is made for tractability. Our results would not qualitatively change if the13
costs and beneﬁts were not perfectly correlated or if the magnitude of the gains from
trade were variable. We assume that cH ≥ cN.
Before going on, we will illustrate the components of the model with reference to
Transatlantic Financing v. United States,14 a case involving commercial impractica-
bility. In this case, the defendant chartered a ship operated by Transatlantic to carry
a cargo of wheat from the United States to Iran. Six days after the ship left port,
the Suez canal was closed by the Egyptian government, forcing the ship to reroute
around the Cape of Good Hope. Transatlantic sued for additional compensation for
its increased expenses. Put into our model, the United States is the risk neutral buyer
and Transatlantic the risk averse seller. The normal cost is the cost of transporting
the wheat via the Suez canal, while the high cost is the cost of transporting via the
longer route.
We assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power ex-ante when a contract
is proposed. In other words, the equilibrium contract is the result of a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer from the buyer to the seller. Ex-post, in some instances, renegotiation
will take place. We assume that the seller has all the bargaining power in the ex-
post renegotiation: if renegotiation occurs, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
to the buyer. The assumption that both ex-ante and ex-post, one or the other of
the parties has all the bargaining power is for expositional ease; none of our results
depends qualitatively on bargaining power being absolute for one or the other. Our
results would not hold, however, if the buyer has all the bargaining power ex-post.
A central issue in this paper is how unforeseen contingencies are modelled, and14
we will discuss verbally our approach before describing the formal modelling. We
assume that ex-post, the court, as well as the parties can recognize some events
that are out of the ordinary. For example, all parties recognize and agree that the
events of 9/11 were, in some sense unforeseen. However, it is likely that for every
possible unfolding of events, one could claim that there is some unforeseen component,
so excusing performance whenever there has been an unforeseen event cannot be a
useful rule. We assume that the court can “categorize” events ex-post in the following
sense. For any given realized event, the court will understand that if performance
were excused in that instance, consistency (i.e., following precedent) would lead it
to excuse performance in similar circumstances in the future. Assuming that the
court can categorize events ex-post essentially means that the court understands
the consequences of excusing performance in the present contractual arrangement on
future contracting parties, if the court wishes to be consistent.
In addition to the court’s categorizing events, we assume that the court, implicitly
or explicitly, assigns a probability to the category of events that are similar to the
events at hand. That is, the court understands that if it desires to be consistent,
excusing performance in the present contract will result in excusing performance in
future contracts with the probability the court assigns to the category of events similar
to the case before it. The basic notion then, is that courts make decisions at the ex-
post stage, but understand that, based on the court’s decision, future contracting
parties will make inferences about the probability that performance will be excused.
In our model, the presumption would be that the closing of the Suez canal was15
unforeseen by both Transatlantic and the United States, and recognized as so by the
courts after the fact. Our assumption is that if courts are consistent, however they will
treat the suit between Transatlantic and the United States, they will treat “similar”
future cases in the same way. This leaves open what cases would be similar – future
cases in which the Suez is again closed? Future cases in which some canal is closed?
Future cases in which some unforeseen event results in increased transportation costs?
In eﬀect, our assumption that the court can categorize the event “Suez closed by
Egyptian government” is an assumption that the court can assign a probability that
the decision in the case at hand will aﬀect future cases. Although we do not include
it in our model, the written opinion accompanying the court’s decision will determine
to a large extent what future cases would be deemed similar in practice.
We formalize these ideas next. With probability (1−q) we assume that the world
is in a “normal” state. In this case the cost of the widget to the seller is cN while
the value of the widget to the buyer is vN = cN + ∆. With the complementary
probability q the world is in a state that will be deemed to be “exceptional”, meaning
that, ex-post, it will be deemed to have been unforeseen. In the case of an unforeseen
state the cost of a widget to the seller and the beneﬁt of the widget to the buyer are
uncertain.
Our aim is to model a court that trades oﬀ the diminished incentive eﬀects re-
sulting from voiding contracts with the insurance gains such voiding generates. Cat-
egorization of an unforeseen event, and assigning that category a probability, allows
the court to measure the incentive costs of excusing performance. What remains is a16
speciﬁcation of the information the court would need to gauge the insurance beneﬁts
of voiding. There cannot be a role for a court that excuses performance if the court
can precisely observe the payoﬀs to the parties; in such a world, the parties could
simply specify a contract price for any change in payoﬀs resulting from unforeseen
contingencies, thereby providing full insurance within the contract itself. Thus, a
necessary condition for a court to have a role that includes excusing performance in
some unforeseen events, but not in all, is that the court must have some idea of the
magnitude of the eﬀect of the unforeseen contingency on payoﬀs, but not observe
precisely (and hence condition on) those payoﬀs. For example, the increased costs to
Transatlantic due to the Suez closure include the opportunity cost of the vessel for
the increased time, which the court might be unable to determine with more precision
than that they were very large. We model the court’s information in the simplest way
to capture this: we will assume that, although the court does not observe whether
the state of the world is normal or exceptional, the court can assess the magnitude of
the impact that this unforeseen contingency has on the parties’ payoﬀs. Speciﬁcally,
in an exceptional state, the cost of the widget to the seller is cH(θ) (and hence, from
the assumption that the gains from trade are constant, the buyer’s valuation is vH(θ)
= cH(θ) + ∆), where θ parameterizes the magnitude of the eﬀect that an unforeseen
state has on the cost and beneﬁt. We further assume that θ is independent of whether
the world is in a normal state or in an exceptional one and it uniformly distributed on
the interval [0,1]. The Court does observe the realization of θ but does not observe
whether the world is in a normal state or in an exceptional one. The value of θ reveals17
to the Court the magnitude of the impact of unforeseen contingencies.
If we denote by g(θ) the diﬀerence between cH and cN for a given θ, we have that
cH(θ) = cN + g(θ) (1)
We also take g to be diﬀerentiable and to satisfy g(θ) = 0 for every θ ∈ [1/2,1] and
lim
θ→0
g(θ) = ∞. Thus, for θ ∈ [1/2,1] there is no risk associated with the cost. This
risk is present for θ ∈ [0,1/2] and increases without bound as θ approaches zero.
To summarize, the parties face a risk at the time they contract that, as a conse-
quence of an unforeseen contingency, the cost and value of the widget will be abnor-
mally high at the time production and delivery are to take place. Ex-post, unforeseen
contingencies will only be recognized by the contracting parties. The court will know
the variance of costs associated with the unforeseen contingency, but not the actual
payoﬀs to the parties. We assume that the parties cannot contract on θ, the eﬀect
that an unforeseen contingency has on the parties’ payoﬀs. They can only rely on the
court to be protected against the uncertainty associated with unforeseen contingencies
(if this is what the court ﬁnds optimal to do).
This risk can be avoided by not contracting ex-ante, and simply contracting after
the state is realized. So that there is a beneﬁt to contracting ex-ante, we assume
that the buyer can undertake an ex-ante, non-contractible, investment e ∈ [0,1] at
a cost ψ(e), where we assume that ψ is twice diﬀerentiable, convex, and satisﬁes
ψ0(0) = 0 and lim
e→1ψ
0(e) = +∞. A buyer’s investment of e increases the value to18
him of the widget of an amount eR. Consequently, if the buyer chooses the level
of relationship-speciﬁc investment e his value of the widget is eR + ∆ + ci, where
i ∈ {N,H}.
Since the buyer is risk-neutral, he maximizes expected proﬁt, minus the convex
cost of investment as above. The risk-averse seller maximizes the expected value of a
strictly increasing twice diﬀerentiable V : IR → IR. To embody risk-aversion, we also
take V to be strictly concave so that V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0.
The timing of the model can be speciﬁed as follows. The parties form beliefs
about the court’s rule for enforcing or excusing performance, based on the court’s
past record (that is, based on the precedents). Negotiation then takes place between
the contracting parties. Recall that the buyer has all the bargaining power at this
stage, hence negotiation is a simple take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract from the
buyer to the seller. A contract may specify an ex-ante transfer; if it does, the transfer
is made immediately after a contract is agreed upon.15 After the negotiation of an
ex-ante contract the buyer chooses the level of speciﬁc investment e that increases
the value of the widget to him by eR.
The state of the world—whether the parties trade in a normal or in an exceptional
state—is then realized and is observed by both parties to the contract. Moreover,
we also assume that the parties to a contract observe the exact value of the cost ci,
i ∈ {N,H}. Should the court become involved, as we discussed above, it does not
observe whether the parties operate in a normal or in an exceptional state but does
know the magnitude of the impact that an unforeseen contingency might have on the19
parties’ welfare. In other words the Court observes the realization of θ. Either party
can bring the other side to court, and if this occurs, the court is assumed to mandate
or excuse performance consistent with past rulings.
In the case in which the court decides to void the existing contract, renegotiation
takes place between the buyer and the seller. Renegotiation is modelled as a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer from the seller to the buyer of a price at which to trade. When
renegotiation occurs, following the court’s decision to void the contract, the parties’
outside options are represented by the payoﬀs associated with no trade. These payoﬀs
are normalized to zero.
Finally, trade occurs according to the terms of the original contract, if the court
decides to enforce it, or according to the terms of the renegotiated agreement, if the
court decides to void the original ex-ante contract.
3. The Optimal Ex-ante Contract
Given our assumptions above the parties to a contract can only specify in an ex-ante
contract a constant price at which to trade p, and an ex-ante transfer from the buyer
to the seller t. If the parties decide to draw up such an ex-ante contract, it is then
left to the court to determine whether or not to protect them against the possibly
very large risk associated with the unforeseen contingencies.
We identify the optimal court’s ruling solving the model backwards from the last
stage. We begin with the renegotiation that follows the court’s decision to void the
contract. Denote ˆ e the given level of investment chosen by the buyer. Since the seller20
has all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage he will receive all the gains
from trade available to the parties; these of course total ˆ e R + ∆.
Consider now the court’s decision if one of the two parties brings the other to
court. Without loss of generality, we can specify the court’s decision rule to be a
set E ⊆ [0,1]. The court enforces all contracts when θ ∈ E, and voids all contracts
otherwise.16 In other words, when the impact of the unforeseen contingency on the
parties’ welfare is too high, the court provides the parties with insurance by voiding
the existing contract.
The court determines E prior to the parties’ negotiation of the ex-ante contract.
In other words, the parties infer the court’s decision rule from precedents when they
decide which ex-ante contract to draw up.
Before we analyze the parties’ negotiation of the ex-ante contract, we need to
specify the seller’s and buyer’s outside options if the ex-ante negotiation breaks down.
Notice that even in the absence of an ex-ante contract the parties can still trade the
widget ex-post. Recall that in any ex-post negotiation the seller has all the bargaining
power. Hence, in any ex-post agreement he appropriates all the gains from trade and
receives utility V (¯ e R + ∆), where ¯ e is the level of speciﬁc investment chosen by the
buyer in the absence of any ex-ante contract. The buyer receives a zero share of the
gains from trade.
Notice that the advantage for the parties to trade ex-post is that they do not face
any uncertainty, and therefore the seller is provided with full insurance. However,
since the returns to the buyer from his ex-ante investment are zero, he will choose21
an investment level such that ψ0(¯ e) = 0. In other words, when trade takes place
ex-post because there is no ex-ante contract the buyer has no incentive to invest:
¯ e = 0. We can then conclude that, in the absence of an ex-ante contract the buyer’s
payoﬀ is 0 while the seller’s level of utility is V (∆). The seller is fully insured but
no relationship-speciﬁc investment is undertaken by the buyer. The buyer’s outside
option when the ex-ante contract is negotiated is 0, while the seller’s outside option
is V (∆).
Next, we turn to the parties’ negotiation of the ex-ante contract. Recall that ex-
ante the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller of a contract (p,t). Given
the court’s decision rule E, and a level of investment ˆ e, the seller’s expected utility
associated with (p,t) can now be written as follows.
VE(p,t, ˆ e) =
Z
E




V (ˆ eR + ∆ + t) dθ
(2)
Notice that the ﬁrst integral in (2) refers to the case in which the contract is upheld
by the court. The second integral in (2) captures those cases in which the court voids
the ex-ante contract.
Taking again as given the court’s decision rule E and a level of investment ˆ e, the




[q(ˆ eR + ∆ + cH(θ) − p) + (1 − q)(ˆ eR + ∆ + cN − p)]dθ − t−ψ(ˆ e) (3)22
If we set θE =
Z
E
dθ, recalling that cH(θ) = cN + g(θ), the payoﬀs in (2) and (3) can
be rewritten more simply as
VE(p,t, ˆ e) =
Z
E
[q V (p + t − cN − g(θ)) + (1 − q)V (p + t − cN)] dθ+
+ (1 − θE) V (ˆ eR + ∆ + t)
(4)
and
BE(p,t, ˆ e) = θE [ˆ eR + ∆ + cN − p] + q
Z
E
g(θ) dθ − t − ψ(ˆ e) (5)
From (5) it is immediate that given (p,t) and the court’s decision rule E the buyer
will select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment ˆ e such that
ψ
0(ˆ e) = θE R (6)
We can now state the buyer’s optimization problem for choosing an ex-ante con-
tract. Given the court’s decision rule E, the buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the




s.t. VE(p,t, ˆ e) ≥ V (∆)
BE(p,t, ˆ e) ≥ 0
ψ0(ˆ e) = θE R
(7)23
Where the ﬁrst two constraints guarantee that it is optimal for both the seller and
the buyer to sign an ex-ante contract rather than to trade ex-post. If the feasible
set of problem (7) is in fact empty, then no ex-ante contract will be signed and
trade will take place ex-post. However, when the court’s decision rule is chosen so
as to maximize the parties’ welfare an ex-ante contract will be signed. We state the
following without formal proof.
Remark 1: For some speciﬁcations of the court’s decision rule the feasible set of
problem (7) is clearly not empty, and the maximized value of the objective function
is strictly positive.
For example, suppose that the court never voids the contract if θ ∈ [1/2,1] and
always voids the contract if θ ∈ [0,1/2) so that E = [1/2,1]. In this case, the agents do
not face any uninsurable risk from unforeseen contingencies, and can take advantage
of a ﬁxed price for the case θ ∈ E so that the buyer will undertake a positive amount
of relationship-speciﬁc investment ˆ e such that ψ0(ˆ e) = R/2. It is clear that in this
case there is an ex-ante contract that is preferred to no contract by both the buyer
and seller.17
Notice that if the court’s decision rule is such that θE = 0 we obtain a trivial special
case, in which the court always voids the contract, the expected proﬁt of the buyer is
0, and the expected utility of the seller is V (∆), whatever the contract (p,t). In this
case, since both parties are indiﬀerent, we assume that they prefer to implement the
same outcome by having no contract at all.24
Our characterization of the optimal contract given the court’s decision rule can
now be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1: Let a decision rule E for the court be given, and assume that it is
such that it is optimal for the parties to draw up an ex-ante contract. Let the optimal
ex-ante contract given E – the solution to problem (7) – be denoted by (p∗
E,t∗
E), with
ˆ eE the associated level of investment. Then p∗
E, t∗













E − cN)] dθ =






E − cN ≥ ˆ eER + ∆ (9)
Moreover the transfer t∗





E, ˆ eE) = V (∆) (10)
Equality (10) of Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of the fact that the seller’s
expected utility is increasing in t, while the buyer’s expected proﬁt is a decreasing
function of t.
The intuition behind (8) and (9) of Proposition 1 is not hard to explain. In those
states in which the contract is renegotiated, the seller necessarily gets a pay-oﬀ (on
top of the transfer t) of ˆ eER+∆. The price p∗
E is chosen so as to provide the seller with25
the optimal partial insurance against the ﬂuctuations of cost between cN and cH(θ)
that occur when the court upholds the contract. This means equating the seller’s
expected marginal utility in this eventuality with the seller’s marginal utility that he
achieves when the contract is voided by the court. Since the seller’s marginal utility
is decreasing, this implies that the price p∗
E minus the lowest cost cN must be above
ˆ eER + ∆.
4. The Court’s Optimal Decision Rule
We are now equipped with the characterization (Proposition 1 above) of the optimal
contract (p∗
E,t∗
E) given an arbitrary decision rule E for the court. This is enough to
proceed to characterize the court’s optimal decision rule.
Recall that our court is a “Stackelberg leader.” Through precedents, its decision
rule is eﬀectively announced to the parties. Taking into account the eﬀect of its choice
of rule on the parties’ behavior, the court then acts so as to maximize their welfare.
From Proposition 1 we know that, as a result of the fact that the buyer makes a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer of an ex-ante contract to the seller, the seller’s expected utility
will be V (∆), regardless of the court’s decision rule. Therefore, the court’s decision
rule can be characterized as the solution to the problem of maximizing the buyer’s
expected proﬁt subject to appropriate constraints.
The court’s maximization problem can be written as follows. Choose the set E of26







E, ˆ eE) ≥ V (∆)
BE(p∗
E,t∗




E) is the optimal ex-ante contract characterized in Proposition 1 above,
and ˆ eE is the associated level of investment.
We begin with two partial characterizations of the court’s optimal decision rule.
Our ﬁrst claim asserts that, provided a solution to problem (11) exists, it will be such
that the court never voids the parties’ ex-ante contract when θ ∈ [1/2,1]; it is never
optimal for the court to void the contract if, given θ, the parties face no risk.
Remark 2: It is optimal for the court to enforce the contract whenever θ ∈ [1/2,1].
More formally, assume that a solution to problem (11) exists. Then any solution E∗
to this problem satisﬁes
[1/2,1] ⊆ E
∗
up to a set of θs of Lebesgue-measure zero.
The intuition behind Remark 2 is simple to outline. The court’s decision to void
the contract provides the parties with insurance against unforeseen contingencies.
Whenever θ ∈ [1/2,1] the cost to the seller is cN with probability one. It is therefore
optimal for the court to enhance the buyer’s incentives to undertake the relationship-
speciﬁc investment by enforcing the ex-ante contract.27
We now turn to a further partial characterization of the court’s optimal decision
rule. We are concerned with the “shape” of the court’s optimal decision rule for those
θs that are in [0,1/2]. We ﬁrst assert that this part of the court’s optimal decision
rule consists of a threshold level θ∗. The court will void the ex-ante contract when
θ < θ∗ is observed, and will uphold the ex-ante contract otherwise.
Remark 3: Assume that a solution to problem (11) exists. Then, up to a set of θs
of Lebesgue-measure zero, any solution to this problem has the form E∗ = [θ∗,1] with
θ∗ ∈ [0,1/2]. In other words, the court will enforce the ex-ante contract if θ ≥ θ∗ and
will void it if θ < θ∗.
The intuition behind this second partial characterization of the optimal court
decision rule can be described as follows. The court is trading oﬀ the insurance it
provides to the parties when it voids the contract with the decrease in incentives
to invest that results from voiding. Incentives are adversely aﬀected because when
the court voids, at the margin, the buyer will not receive a full return from his
investment. Hence, the higher the probability that the court voids, the lower is its
incentive to invest. This negative eﬀect on investment depends only on the probability
that the court will void the contract. On the other hand, the value of the insurance
to the parties from voiding is greater when θ is smaller, since, by assumption, the
spread between cN and cH(θ) becomes higher as θ becomes smaller. Hence, whatever
decrease in incentives is accepted, the optimal thing for the court to do is to void for
the smallest values of θ. In other words, whatever the overall probability that the28
court voids the ex-ante contract, the set of values of θ for which the contract is in
fact voided must take the “threshold” form described in Remark 3.
We now have all the elements to complete the characterization of the court’s
optimal decision rule. We do so in Proposition 2 below. Aside from incorporating the
content of Remarks 2 and 3, Proposition 2 asserts that an optimal decision rule for the
court does in fact exist, that it is unique up to a set of θs of Lebesgue-measure zero,
and that the threshold θ∗ used by the court is interior in the sense that 0 < θ∗ < 1/2.
Proposition 2: An optimal decision rule for the court exists and it is unique up to
a set of θs of Lebesgue-measure zero.
The court’s unique optimal decision rule has the form E∗ = [θ∗,1] with θ∗ ∈
(0,1/2). In other words, given θ, the court upholds the contract when the parties
face no risk, and when the risk they face is suﬃciently low (θ ≥ θ∗). It voids the
contract otherwise.
We have already outlined the intuition behind part of the characterization of the
court’s optimal decision rule presented in Proposition 2. To understand why the
threshold θ∗ used by the court cannot be either 0 or 1/2 it is enough to refer back
to the speciﬁcation of the risk that the unforeseen contingencies entail described in
Section 2 above. Recall that, as θ approaches 1/2 the risk faced by the parties
becomes negligible (cH(θ) approaches cN). Therefore, as θ approaches 1/2, the value
of the insurance that voiding provides shrinks to zero. On the other hand, the costs of
voiding the ex-ante contract do not vanish. The marginal cost (in terms of diminished29
incentives for the buyer to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investment) of increasing
θ∗ does not become zero as this threshold gets closer to 1/2. Therefore the optimal
θ∗ is below 1/2.
Consider now the nature of the risk associated with the unforeseen contingencies
for small θ, approaching 0. In this case, the diﬀerence between cN and cH(θ) becomes
unboundedly large. The gain in incentives from upholding the ex-ante contract is
bounded above (it can never exceed R) while upholding the ex-ante contract becomes
more and more costly as the parties are faced with an ever increasing amount of
uninsurable risk. Therefore the optimal θ∗ is above 0.
5. Frustration, Impracticability and Optimal Courts
The analysis of the optimal court involves the tradeoﬀ between the protection aﬀorded
a risk averse party when performance is excused in the face of unforeseen events, and
the consequent negative eﬀect excuse has on optimal investment by the contracting
parties. Many of the leading cases involving frustration of purpose seem to have
no signiﬁcant investment, hence no tradeoﬀ. The classic frustration case is Krell
v. Henry18. The contract was to rent for two days an apartment overlooking the
coronation route for the coronation of King Edward VII. The coronation was canceled
due to the King’s illness, which was deemed a frustrating event, and the contract to
rent the apartment was voided. It is diﬃcult to see a signiﬁcant investment by either
party, and voiding such a contract would seem simply to entail transferring the risk
associated with the cancellation of the coronation from one party to the other. Absent30
any particular reason to believe one party was inherently more risk averse than the
other, there is little reason for voiding (or not) on eﬃciency grounds. It would seem
that “fairness” rather than a concern for the eﬃciency of investment is at the heart
of this case.
In Lloyd v. Murphy,19 the court was again faced with a frustration case. The
plaintiﬀ leased land to the defendant for ﬁve years solely to sell cars and gasoline
shortly before World War II. After the U.S. entered the war, the government ordered
the sale of most new cars discontinued. The defendant repudiated the contract and
left the premises, whereupon the plaintiﬀ sued for unpaid rent. The court ruled
that both parties knew that the war was coming and that the possibility that car
sales would be curtailed was possible; furthermore, car sales were restricted but not
completely eliminated. The fact that car sales were only “severely restricted” rather
than eliminated would play little role in our model. The issue is rather the risk that
is faced by the intervening event – World War II. There is an important point at
which this case deviates from our model. The costs voiding contracts in our model
stems from the decrease in investments that will be made prior to fulﬁlling contractual
obligations when contacts may be voided. In Lloyd v. Murphy, it is likely that such
costs were incurred by the lessee, and not the lessor. Thus, the logic of our analysis
would suggest that there is little cost of excusing performance on the part of the
lessee.20
Our analysis of an optimal court does bear on Transatlantic v. United States. The
court ruled against Transatlantic, saying that the injured party cannot proceed with31
performance, recover the contracted price, and then recover its extra costs in addition.
While our analysis deals only with a court voiding or enforcing a contract prior to
performance, one expects that the logic carries over to a case in which performance
has begun prior to the intervening event, and it is clear that it is eﬃcient to complete
performance. We emphasize, however, that allowing courts to go beyond voiding or
enforcing contracts by revising the terms of a contract is outside the scope of this
paper.21
In Selland Pontiac-GMC v. King, the plaintiﬀ entered into a contract with the
defendant to supply four chasses for buses. The defendant was to get bodies from a
third party, speciﬁed in the contract, that would be assembled on the chasses. The
third party went out of business and the defendant could not get the bodies, following
which the defendant tried to cancel the order for the chasses. The court held for
the defendant saying that the supply of the bodies was a basic assumption of the
contract. This case ﬁts well within our model: the plaintiﬀ likely incurred nontrivial
costs between the time the contract is signed and the time that the defendant cancels.
If courts excuse performance in similar cases, sellers will decrease the investments they
make due to the risk that contracts may be voided.
6. Concluding Remarks
Modelling decisions. We have taken a particularly simple speciﬁcation of the court’s
strategy set and of its preferences. We will discuss each of these and how it relates
to our analysis above.32
There is a sense in which any restrictions (except for strictly physical ones) on
the court’s strategy set take us back into a “partial equilibrium” approach. If there
are restrictions on the court’s strategy set, who put them there if the model is truly a
closed one? This paper is but one step in the direction of a model that is truly closed
in this sense. 22
Once we take the view that some external considerations must be taken as given,
it is easy to see why our modelling choice of a “simple” strategy set for the court
is plausible. Courts typically face a large pool of possible disputes, and have very
little prior speciﬁc knowledge about each case. It is clearly eﬃcient to develop court
procedures that are “detail free” wherever possible in the sense of being robust to
even large variations in the parameters characterizing the situations to which they
apply. Our courts that can only void or uphold contracts rather than dictate new
terms of trade are a simple way to capture some of these considerations.
The restricted strategy space for the court that we have worked with in this paper
can also be interpreted as a crude way to model the eﬀects of a richer domain for
the preferences of the court. In particular it is clear that in a dynamic world courts
must care about the reputation they accumulate about their rulings. In the static
analysis above, precedents are assumed to be equivalent to the court announcing to
the parties the rule that it will use in case of a dispute. In a richer dynamic model
this would be substituted by the reputation that the court has. At this point the
rationale for simple behavior becomes, again, apparent. In practice, simple rules will
have greater “penetration” as the reputation of the court among the pool of (possibly33
simple-minded) contracting parties who might take their disputes before the court.
Are courts necessary? One might ask whether courts are necessary to insure
against unforeseen contingencies. Should it not be possible for the parties to specify
within the contract the nature of the events in which performance is to be excused?
It is possible, and in fact common, for parties to specify within a contract that
performance is to be excused in particular circumstances, for example, a force majeure
clause. A contract provision that excuses one or both parties from part or all of their
obligations in the event of war, natural disaster, or some other event outside the
parties’ control. An example of such a clause found on the web is as follows.
Neither party shall be liable in damages or have the right to terminate this
Agreement for any delay or default in performing hereunder if such delay
or default is caused by conditions beyond its control including, but not
limited to Acts of God, Government restrictions (including the denial or
cancellation of any export or other necessary license), wars, insurrections
and/or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of the party whose
performance is aﬀected.23
Such a clause would not eliminate the need for an analysis as in this paper. A half
inch of snow is certainly outside the parties’ control, and it might slow down slightly
a truck making a contractually agreed upon delivery, but a court would rule against
a party seeking to be excused from performing on account of the snow. Unless courts
implicitly or explicitly set a threshold for excusing performance, any party that would34
like a contract voided can always ﬁnd some event that may technically fall within the
force majeure clause. A court then must determine whether a contractual dispute
actually does fall within a force majeure clause.
Our court increases eﬃciency by excusing performance in circumstances that are
deemed to have been unforeseen, and further, that expose at least one of the parties
to risk of substantial magnitude. The court, of course, is acting after all uncertainty
has been resolved (even though the court does not fully know the realization). Hence,
excusing performance at that date is simply a transfer from one party to the second.
The increases in eﬃciency that stem from voiding a contract are a consequence of
superior risk-sharing between future contracting parties. It follows, then, that it is not
simply the voiding or enforcement of a contract that determines the eﬃciency gains,
but the expectations induced in future contracting parties due to the court’s decision.
If the court determines that performance is to be excused, there is still substantial
scope for the court to aﬀect expectations through its written decision. Future parties’
expectations will be quite diﬀerent following narrowly written decisions than following
broadly written ones.
It is worth pointing out that contracting parties will often have information ex
ante that courts will not have, even ex post, including for example, the likelihood
of certain kinds of events, the risk aversion of the parties and the importance of
ex-ante investments. The optimal court decision rule will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
contracting pairs. The existence of diﬀerent venues for adjudicating disputes can
allow for diﬀerent levels of insurance by applying diﬀerent thresholds for excusing35
performance. Thus the selection of, say, New York or Delaware law to govern a
contract may be about the level of insurance that is optimal for a contracting pair as
about expertise in commercial law.36
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem (7). After





E − cH(θ)) + (1 − q)V 0(p∗
E + t∗
E − cN)] dθ = θE V 0(ˆ eER + ∆ + t∗
E) (A.1)
which of course proves (8). Since V 00 < 0 and cH(θ) ≥ cN for every θ
q V 0(p∗
E + t∗
E − cH(θ)) + (1 − q)V 0(p∗
E + t∗
E − cN) ≥ V 0(p∗
E + t∗
E − cN). (A.2)
Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) yields
V 0(ˆ eER + ∆ + t∗
E) ≥ V 0(p∗
E + t∗
E − cN)
which together with the fact that V 00 < 0 implies (9).
The fact that (10) holds follows from the fact that the seller’s expected utility VE(p,t, ˆ e) is
monotonic increasing in t while the buyer’s expected surplus BE(p,t, ˆ e) is monotonic decreasing in
t.
Lemma A.1: Let E∗ be any solution to problem (11), with associated p∗, t∗ and ˆ e. Then up to a
set of Lebesgue measure zero E∗ must have the following property.
Let ˆ θ be any point in [0,1]. Then if the quantity




+λ[qV (p∗ + t∗ − cN − g(ˆ θ)) + (1 − q)V (p∗ + t∗ − cN) − V (ˆ eR + ∆ + t∗)]
(A.3)
is strictly less than zero it must be that ˆ θ 6∈ E∗. Conversely, if the quantity in (A.3) strictly greater
than zero, then it must be that ˆ θ ∈ E∗.37
Proof: Consider the total change, as a function of γ, in the Lagrangean of problem (7) when we
subtract from E∗ the arbitrarily small interval [ˆ θ, ˆ θ + γ]. After some manipulations, at γ = 0, the
total marginal change in the Lagrangean can be seen to equal −1 times the quantity in (A.3).
Therefore if the quantity in (A.3) is negative the value of the Lagrangean can be increased by
subtracting from E∗ the interval [ˆ θ, ˆ θ + γ], for γ appropriately small. This contradicts the fact that
E∗ is the solution to problem (11). Clearly this proves our ﬁrst claim.
The proof of our second claim involves a completely symmetric argument, and the details are
omitted.
Lemma A.2: Let any E such that E ∩ [0,1/2] has positive Lebesgue measure be given. Then the
quantity in (A.3) is strictly increasing in ˆ θ for all ˆ θ ∈ [0, ˜ θ) with 0 < ˜ θ < 1/2. It is strictly decreasing
in ˆ θ for all ˆ θ ∈ [˜ θ,1/2), and it is constant over the interval ˆ θ ∈ [1/2,1].





V 0(p∗ + t∗ + cN − g(ˆ θ))
V 0(ˆ eR + ∆ + t∗)
#
(A.4)
Our claim is now easily veriﬁed using (A.4) if we let ˜ θ be such that p∗ − cN − g(˜ θ∗) = ˆ eR + ∆, and
recalling that g0(ˆ θ) is negative over [0,1/2) and zero otherwise.
Lemma A.3: Let E∗ be any solution to problem (11), with associated p∗, t∗ and ˆ e. Then the value
of the quantity in (A.3) is strictly greater than zero for every ˆ θ ∈ [1/2,1].
Proof: Assume by contradiction that this quantity is non-positive. Then using Lemma A.2 it must
be that, without loss of generality, either E∗ = ∅ or that E∗ ⊆ [0,1/2]. This ﬁrst possibility is ruled
out by Remark 1, so our contradiction hypothesis is E∗ ⊆ [0,1/2].38
Now consider an alternative enforcement set E0 with θ∗
E = θE0 and E0 ⊆ [1/2,1]. Given E0, the
solution to problem (7), p∗
E0, t∗
E0, ˆ eE0 is easily seen to have the following properties. First of all, ˆ eE0
= ˆ e. Moreover, p∗
E0 = ˆ eER + ∆ + cN, and t∗
E0 = −ˆ eR.
Therefore, the buyer’s payoﬀ in the solution to problem (7), given E0 is equal to
ˆ eR − ψ(ˆ e) (A.5)
After elementary manipulations, the payoﬀ to the buyer in the solution to problem (7) given E∗
can be written as




[q(p∗ + t∗ − cN − g(θ)) + (1 − q)(p∗ + t∗ − cN)]dθ
(A.6)
Using (10) and the concavity of V , it is immediate to show that the quantity in (A.6) is strictly
smaller than the payoﬀ in (A.5). Since this contradicts the fact that E∗ is a solution to problem
(11), it suﬃces to prove our claim.
Lemma A.4: The quantity in (A.3) becomes negative as ˆ θ approaches zero.
Proof: From (A.3) it is suﬃcient to show that the quantity
g(ˆ θ) + λV (p∗ + t∗ − cN − g(ˆ θ)) (A.7)
diverges to −∞ as ˆ θ approaches zero. This can easily be veriﬁed dividing through by g(ˆ θ), using
l’Hˆ ospital’s rule, and recalling that V 0 is decreasing and that, by assumption, limˆ θ→0 g(ˆ θ) = ∞. The
details are omitted.
Proof of Remark 2: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.1 and A.3.39
Proof of Remark 3: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Proof of Proposition 2: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4.40
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that the solution to problem (7) is in fact unique.
18 Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A. 1903).
19 Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944).
20 If the sale of cars entailed a signiﬁcant investment on the part of the lessee, there would be a
nontrivial tradeoﬀ had it been the lessor who asked that the contract be voided.
21 American Trading & Production v. Shell International Marine (American Trading & Pro-
duction Corporation v. Shell International Marine, 453 F2d 939 (2nd Cir. 1972)) is similar to
Transatlantic v. United States in that American Trading sued Shell for extra compensation that
resulted from the Suez closing. It diﬀered in that the amounts were approximately double those in
the Transatlantic v. United States case, but the court’s decision was the same, namely to deny the
extra compensation.
22 In a diﬀerent context — the design of a “legal system” for society as a whole — Mailath, Morris,
and Postlewaite (2000) explore a model in which all “laws” are cheap-talk. They ﬁnd that the role
of the legal system in this case is limited to selecting among the multiple equilibria of the game
determined by the physical description of the environment. See also the discussion in Schwartz and
Watson (2004).
23 Liblicense: Licensing Digital Information http://www.library.yale.edu/˜llicense/forcecls.shtml.43
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